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ABSTRACT
This paper characterizes a robust optimal policy rule in a simple forward-looking model, when the
policymaker faces uncertainty about model parameters and shock processes. We show that the robust
optimal policy rule is likely to involve a stronger response of the interest rate to fluctuations in
inflation and the output gap than is the case in the absence of uncertainty. Thus parameter uncertainty
alone does not necessarily justify a small response of monetary policy to perturbations. However
uncertainty may amplify the degree of "super-inertia" required by optimal monetary policy. We
finally discuss the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions.
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mg2190@columbia.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
During the last decade, economists have given increasing attention to the study of interest-rate
feedback rules for the conduct of monetary policy. While some have focused on the estimation of
central banks reaction functions, and the description of actual monetary policy (see, e.g., Taylor,
1993, Judd and Rudebusch, 1998, Clarida et al., 2000), others have characterized optimal policy
rules in the context of particular models of the economy (see, e.g., contributions collected in Taylor
1999a, Giannoni and Woodford, 2002, 2003, among many others). In reality, however, policy
decisions need to be made despite considerable uncertainty about the actual functioning of the
economy. Policymakers typically set their instrument without knowing the true model of the
economy, and they generally do not know precisely how their policy actions will aﬀect the variables
that they care about. The prevalence of uncertainty has recently induced researchers to explore
various ways to characterize desirable policy rules in the face of uncertainty (see Walsh, 2003).
A popular idea due to Brainard (1967), and emphasized by Blinder (1998) and others, is that
policymakers should be cautious in the presence of uncertainty about the true parameters of a
model. By “cautious” it is often meant that the instrument of monetary policy should be moved
by less than in the absence of parameter uncertainty.1 Some authors have therefore suggested that
optimal policy rules that take proper account of the uncertainty surrounding model parameters
should be less aggressive, and thus closer to estimated policy rules.2 However, a number of recent
studies have challenged this conventional wisdom. For instance, in Giannoni (2002), we argue that
the opposite result is likely to be obtained in a simple forward-looking model that has been used
in many recent studies of monetary policy. In that paper, we show that simple Taylor rules that
are robust to uncertainty about structural parameters of the model may be more responsive to
ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and the output gap than the optimal Taylor in the absence of parameter
uncertainty.
We call robust optimal policy rules policy rules that perform best in the worst-case parameter
conﬁguration, within a speciﬁed set of parameter conﬁgurations. Policy rules of this kind have
1As Brainard (1967) pointed out, this result holds in his setup provided that the exogenous disturbances and the
parameters that relate the policy instrument to the target variable are not too strongly correlated.
2See Clarida et al. (1999), Estrella and Mishkin (1999), Hall et al. (1999), Martin and Salmon (1999), Svensson
(1999), Rudebusch (2000), Sack (2000), Söderström (2000), and Wieland (1998), among others.
1recently been advocated by Sargent (1999), Hansen and Sargent (2000, 2003, 2005), Stock (1999),
Onatski and Stock (2002), and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001).3 Robust rules are designed
to avoid an especially poor performance of monetary policy in the event of an unfortunate para-
meter conﬁguration. They guarantee to yield an acceptable performance of monetary policy in the
speciﬁed range of models.
This paper generalizes the results obtained in Giannoni (2002) in several important ways. First,
instead of restricting ourselves to Taylor rules, we determine a robust optimal monetary policy rule
in a family of rules that is ﬂexible enough to implement the optimal plan, if the parameters are
known with certainty. Second, we allow the model to be aﬀected by a variety of exogenous shocks,
instead of assuming a single composite exogenous perturbation. We emphasize in particular the
distinction between eﬃcient and ineﬃcient supply shocks, as they have diﬀerent welfare implica-
tions, and consider uncertainty about the relative importance of each kind of shock. Thirdly, we
consider robustness of monetary policy not only to uncertainty about critical structural parame-
ters, but also to uncertainty about the degree of persistence in the shock processes. Moreover,
we emphasize the importance of deriving the model from microeconomic foundations in order to
determine precisely how the exogenous disturbances are transmitted through the economy. This
turns out to be important for the determination of the worst-case parameter conﬁguration.
While it is often believed that monetary policy should be less responsive in the presence of
uncertainty, we show that the opposite is likely to be true in the model considered. For a reasonable
calibration of the model, the robust optimal policy rule requires the interest rate to respond more
strongly to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation, in changes in the output gap, and to lagged interest rates, than
in the absence of uncertainty. This result depends however on the way the exogenous shocks aﬀect
the economy, and on the degree of uncertainty about the types of supply shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next subsection reviews brieﬂys o m eo f
the recent literature on robust monetary policy. Section 2 describes the method used to derive
the robust optimal policy rule. Section 3 presents a simple optimizing monetary model. While
the model is similar to models presented in a number of recent studies, we brieﬂye x p o s et h e
microeconomic foundations of this model to specify precisely how exogenous disturbances aﬀect
3Von zur Muehlen (1982) is an early study of such monetary policy rules.
2the endogenous variables, when there is uncertainty about the structural parameters of the model.
Section 4 characterizes both the optimal policy rule in the absence of uncertainty, and the robust
optimal policy rule when there is uncertainty, and discusses the sensitivity of the results to various
assumptions. Finally, section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related literature
The uncertainty faced by policymakers takes many diﬀerent forms. The data that measures impor-
tant economic concepts is often imperfect as it may contain measurement errors or be available only
after policy decisions are made, and some of the key macroeconomic variables such as the output
gap and shocks are generally not directly observed by the central bank. Optimal policy in such
environments is analyzed by Aoki (2003), Orphanides (2003), and Svensson and Woodford (2003,
2004). Others, including this paper, assume that the state of the economy is perfectly observed
once the shocks are realized, but that policymakers don’t know the true model of the economy, so
that they only have an imperfect knowledge of eﬀect of policy actions on key economic variables.
Therefore, they seek to determine policy rules that are robust to uncertainty about the correct
model of the economy.
One approach, ﬁrst advocated by McCallum (1988, 1999), and followed by Christiano and Gust
(1999), Taylor (1999b), Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999, 2003), Levin and Williams (2003),
determines policy rules that perform well across a range of models, by simulating given rules in a
number of diﬀerent models. Brock, Durlauf and West (2003, 2004) have made further advances by
proposing a formal framework – Bayesian model averaging – and statistics grounded in decision
theory to systematically evaluate alternative policy rules in the face of model uncertainty. An
advantage of this approach is that it allows an analysis of model uncertainty when the models
considered are potentially very diﬀerent from each others. While extremely useful for understanding
the eﬀects of particular rules in various models, existing applications of this approach do actually
not determine an “optimal” rule in the face of model uncertainty.
Other studies have sought to characterize optimal policy in particular classes of models, taking
into account uncertainty about various aspects of the model. Researchers have for instance consid-
ered uncertainty about the parameters of the model and have used Bayesian methods to determine
3the policy that minimizes the expected loss, given a prior distribution on the parameters. This
approach, initially started by Brainard (1967) and developed by Chow (1975) has more recently
been followed by Clarida et al. (1999), Wieland (1998), Estrella and Mishkin (1999), Hall et al.
(1999), Martin and Salmon (1999), Svensson (1999), Sack (2000), Rudebusch (2001), Söderström
(2000, 2002), and Kurozumi (2003) among others. Most of these studies focus on backward-looking
models, and support Brainard’s popular result that optimal policy should be less aggressive in the
face of parameter uncertainty.4
Another branch of the literature has looked for robust rules that minimize a loss criterion in some
worst-case scenario, within a speciﬁed set of possible scenarios. One justiﬁcation for this approach
is the view that uncertainty about the true model of the economy takes the form of uncertainty in
the sense of Knight (1921), i.e., a situation in which the probabilities on the alternative models are
not known, so that Bayesian methods cannot be used to compute the expected loss over diﬀerent
models.5 Furthermore, it has been shown by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) that if the policymaker
has multiple priors on the set of alternative models, and his preferences satisfy uncertainty aversion
in addition to the axioms of standard expected utility theory, the policymaker faces a min-max
problem: to minimize his loss in the worst-case scenario, i.e., when the prior distribution is the
worst distribution in the set of possible distributions. Several authors have recently applied robust
control theory, to derive robust monetary policies of this kind. These authors have however focused
on diﬀerent types of uncertainty.
For instance, Sargent (1999), Hansen and Sargent (2005), and Kasa (2002) consider very un-
structured uncertainty by appending to their equations shock terms that represent model misspeci-
ﬁcations – i.e., deviations of the model actually used from the true model – and limit uncertainty
by imposing a penalty on the statistical distance (the relative entropy) between the model used
and the perturbed model. They compute robust policies by minimizing a given loss criterion in
the worst-case realization of the shock process that represent misspeciﬁcations. In contrast, Stock
(1999), Onatski and Stock (2002), Onatski (2000a, 2000b), Onatski and Williams (2003), and
4One notable exception is Söderström (2002) who shows that uncertainty about the persistence of inﬂation induces
the policymaker to respond more aggressively to shocks. Clarida et al. (1999) and Kurozumi (2005) consider a
forward-looking model.
5Knight (1921) ﬁrst made the distinction between “known risk,” i.e. a situation in which a distribution of outcomes
is known, and “uncertainty”, i.e., a situation in which no known probability distribution exists.
4Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001) consider more structured non-parametric uncertainty. They
construct a non-parametric set of models around some reference model that approximates the true
model of the economy, but they impose some structure on the set of possible models. They then
seek to determine rules that minimize the loss for the worst possible model. These authors measure
the robustness of given policy rules with the maximal size of the uncertainty set that does not
include models with an indeterminate equilibrium or unstable models. While they can measure the
degree of robustness of given rules, they are able to characterize the actual min-max rules only for
simple types of uncertainty.
In this paper, as in Giannoni (2002), we consider uncertainty about the parameters of a struc-
tural forward-looking model. In contrast to Hansen and Sargent (2005), we maintain the rational
expectations framework, by assuming that the private sector knows the true model of the economy,
while the policymaker faces model uncertainty. We ﬁnd the parametric treatment more intuitive,
transparent, than a non-parametric approach, and b e l i e v et h a ti ta l l o w sm o d e l e r st oq u a n t i f yt h e i r
degree of conﬁdence more easily. This approach allows us furthermore to characterize analytically
the robust rule, in suﬃciently simple models. While we allow for uncertainty about a relatively
small number of parameters, in the analysis below, one can in principle specify a large class of model
uncertainty with parameter uncertainty, to the extent that the models can be nested parametrically.
For instance, uncertainty about the variables entering particular equations, the numbers of lags of
such variables, the importance of backward versus forward-looking behavior may be analyzed with
parameter uncertainty. In practice, however, this approach may be more restrictive than the un-
structured approach, as it may not be feasible to analyze the eﬀects of a very large number of
uncertain parameters. Approaches based on unstructured uncertainty may thus provide more con-
venient methods in cases in which one is worried about a wide range of possible misspeciﬁcations
around a reference model. Parameter uncertainty is also not well suited to address uncertainty
about models that are “disjoint” or very diﬀerent from each other, and Bayesian model averaging
methods advocated by Brock et al. (2003, 2004) may be more suited in such contexts.
So far, there is no clear answer to whether robust policy rules in the presence of uncertainty
should in general be more or less aggressive than optimal rules absent model uncertainty, even
5among the papers that use min-max objective functions.6 Sargent (1999), Stock (1999), and
Onatski and Stock (2002) ﬁnd that robust policy requires in most cases stronger policy responses,
in backward-looking models. We obtain similar results for a simple forward-looking model and in
the face of parameter uncertainty. Onatski (2000b) ﬁnds robust rules to be more responsive to the
output gap and less responsive to inﬂation in a model that involves both forward- and backward-
looking elements. Whether robust policy rules should in general be more or less aggressive than
optimal rules absent model uncertainty depends critically both on the model and the type of uncer-
tainty – i.e. structured or non-structured – considered. In section 4.4, we discuss how changing
various assumptions about the model can aﬀect the results.
2 Uncertainty and Robust Optimal Monetary Policy
In reality, central banks and researchers do generally not know with certainty the true parameters of
their model, in addition to not knowing the exogenous disturbances. In this paper, we assume that
the parameters of the economic model are unknown to the policymaker, but remain constant over
time. The policymaker commits credibly at the beginning of period 0 to a policy rule for the entire
future. He chooses a policy rule to minimize some loss criterion L0, while facing uncertainty about
the true parameters of the economy. We denote by ψ the vector of coeﬃcients that completely
characterizes the policy rule, and we simply call ψ a “policy rule”. We assume furthermore that
the policy rules ψ are drawn from some ﬁnite-dimensional linear space ˜ Ψ ∈ Rn.
In contrast, agents in the private sector are assumed to know the true parameters of the economy.
They act optimally, i.e., in a way to maximize their utility subject to their constraints, in every
period, and in every state. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the private sector may be one of many
diﬀerent types. Its type is determined once and for all, before period 0, and is characterized by the
ﬁnite-dimensional vector of structural parameters θ =[ θ1,θ2,...,θm]
0 deﬁned on the compact set
Θ ⊆ Rm. Agents in the private sector know the true type θ, but the central bank does not.
We write qt for the vector of endogenous variables at date t, and q for the stochastic process
6It is sometimes believed that the results diﬀer importantly for a Bayesian or a min-max approach. This is however
not generally true. Onatski (2000a), for instance, shows that the results obtained with the min-max approach are
very similar to those obtained with the Bayesian approach in the Brainard (1967) setting.
6{qt}
∞
t=0 , specifying qt at each date as a function of the history of exogenous shocks until that date.
The behavior of the private sector is determined by a set of equations for each date t,a n de a c h
state. These may be written compactly as
S(q,θ)=0. (1)
The restrictions imposed by the commitment to the policy rule at each date can in turn be written
as
P(q,ψ)=0. (2)
A rational expectations equilibrium is then deﬁned as a stochastic process q(ψ,θ) satisfying the
structural equations (1) and the policy rule (2), at each date, and in every state. We restrict our
a t t e n t i o nt oas u b s e tΨ ⊆ ˜ Ψ of policy rules that result in a unique bounded rational expectations
equilibrium, and let q(ψ,θ) denote this equilibrium.
When the structural parameters are known with certainty, the optimal monetary policy rule
that is optimal relative to the subset of rules Ψ can be deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 I nt h ec a s eo fk n o w ns t r u c t u r a lp a r a m e t e r sθ, let Ψ be a set of policy rules such that





where L0 (q) is the policymaker’s loss function, and the unconditional expectation is taken over all
possible histories of the disturbances.
To characterize parameter uncertainty, we assume that the vector θ of structural parameters
lies in a given (known) compact set Θ, and that the distribution of θ is unknown. As argued
in the previous section, it results from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) that if the policymaker has
multiple priors on Θ (including the priors that any element θ ∈ Θ holds with certainty), and
his preferences satisfy uncertainty aversion in addition to the axioms of standard expected utility
theory, the policymaker’s problem is to minimize his loss in the worst-case parameter conﬁguration.
The optimal policy rule is then the robust rule deﬁned as following.
7Deﬁnition 2 Let Ψ be a set of policy rules such that there is a unique bounded equilibrium process
q(ψ,θ) for all ψ ∈ Ψ,θ∈ Θ. In the case of parameter uncertainty, a robust optimal monetary









where L0 (q) is the policymaker’s loss function, and where the unconditional expectation is taken
over all possible histories of the disturbances.
Given that the unknown parameter vector is in Θ, the policymaker can guarantee that the loss
is no higher than the one obtained in the following “minmax” equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 3 A minmax equilibrium is a bounded rational expectations equilibrium q∗ = q(ψ∗,θ∗),
where ψ∗ ∈ Ψ is a robust optimal monetary policy rule and θ∗ maximizes the loss E[L0 (q(ψ∗,θ))]
on the constraint set Θ.
However, the equilibrium that actually realizes (given the exogenous processes) depends upon
t h et r u ev a l u eo fθ, and is hence unknown to the policymaker.
To characterize the robust optimal policy rule, we apply the method proposed in Giannoni
(2002).7 This method relates the solution to the problem (3) to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(NE) of a zero-sum two-player game between a policymaker and a malevolent Nature. In this game,
the policymaker chooses the policy rule ψ∗ ∈ Ψ to maximize his loss L(ψ,θ) ≡ E[L0 (q(ψ,θ))]
knowing that a malevolent Nature tries to hurt him as much as possible. Symmetrically, Nature
chooses the parameter vector θ∗ ∈ Θ to maximize the policymaker’s loss, knowing that the pol-
icymaker is going to minimize it. A NE of this game, (ψ∗,θ∗), involves a best response on the
part both players. Moreover, since this is a zero-sum game, the equilibrium action of each player
is a minmaximizer so that the equilibrium strategy ψ∗ is a solution to (3) (see Giannoni, 2002, for
additional details).
7Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) propose a related approach to derive robust policy rules in the case of local
uncertainty about the parameter vector. The approach adopted here, however, can be applied to situations in which
the uncertainty is large.
8The solution procedure involves the four following steps to characterize the robust optimal rule
ψ∗.8
1. Optimal equilibrium for any given parameter vector θ. We determine the equilibrium process
q∗ (θ) that minimizes the loss ˆ L(q) ≡ E[L0 (q)] subject to the restrictions imposed by the
structural equations (1) for any θ ∈ Θ.
2. Candidate minmax equilibrium. Using q∗ (θ) from step 1, we determine numerically the can-
didate worst parameter vector θ∗ in the allowed set, i.e., the parameter vector that maximizes
ˆ L(q∗ (θ)) in the set Θ. The process q∗ (θ∗) is the candidate minmax equilibrium.
3. Optimal policy rule. We look for a policy rule ψ∗ that implements the candidate minmax
equilibrium, i.e., that solves P(q∗ (θ∗),ψ∗)=0. We then verify that the policy rule ψ∗ is in
Ψ, i.e., that it results in a unique bounded equilibrium process q(ψ∗,θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
4. Check for existence of global NE. We verify that (ψ∗,θ∗) is a global NE, hence that q(ψ∗,θ∗)
is indeed a minmax equilibrium, by checking that the solution candidate θ∗ maximizes the






given the policy rule ψ∗.
Steps 1 and 3 determine the policymaker’s best response ψ∗ = ψ∗ (θ∗) to a given parameter
vector θ∗. Step 2 and 4 insure in turn that θ∗ is Nature’s best response to ψ∗. It follows that a
proﬁle (ψ∗,θ∗) that satisﬁes steps 1 to 4 is a NE, and hence that ψ∗ is the robust optimal rule
that we are looking for. Step 4 is required to insure that the candidate worst parameter vector
computed in step 2 is indeed Nature’s best response to the robust optimal rule ψ∗ on the whole
8The method presented in Giannoni (2002) is more general than the one summarized here for two reasons. First,
it considers a loss function of the form L0 (q,θ), where the second argument allows the coeﬃcients of the loss function
to be functions of the parameter vector θ. Second, it allows one to characterize robust optimal rules in restricted
families of policy rules. As these restricted families of rules impose restrictions besides (1) and (2) on the space of
possible processes, the space of possible processes is parametrized by an alternative parameter vector f. We don’t
need to consider this complication here, as the family of policy rules that we consider below does not impose any
additional restrictions besides (1) and (2).
9constraint set Θ, so that (ψ∗,θ∗) is not only a local NE – i.e., a situation in which each player’s
strategy is at least locally a best response to the other player’s strategy – but also a global NE.
Note that a global NE may not exist, even though a robust optimal rule should still exist. However,
in applications such as the one in section 4, a global NE will exist.
While steps 2 and 4 require a numerical maximization of the loss function with respect to θ,o n
the set Θ, it is simpler to characterize the robust optimal rule following the four steps mentioned
here, than trying to solve (3) directly. Indeed, solving (3) would require maximizing the loss function
over θ for any given policy rule ψ, until the robust rule ψ∗ is obtained. In addition, the solution
procedure proposed here may allow one to obtain an analytical characterization of the robust rule
as will be the case in section 4.9
3 A Simple Optimizing Model for Monetary Policy Analysis
The model that characterizes the behavior of the private sector is a variant of the “new Keynesian”
or “new synthesis” model presented, e.g., in Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003). In order
to understand precisely how the shocks aﬀect the economy, we brieﬂy describe the model that
characterizes the private sector’s behavior, and then turn to the objective of monetary policy.
3.1 Underlying Structural Model
We assume that there exists a continuum of households indexed by j and distributed uniformly on
the [0,1] interval. Each household j consumes all of the goods and supplies a single diﬀerentiated






















where β ∈ (0,1) is the household’s discount factor (assumed to be equal for each household),M
j
t
is the amount of money balances held at the end of period t, yt (j) is the household’s supply of its
9Note that if we compute the worst vector θ
∗ by maximizing directly L(q(ψ
∗ (θ),θ)) with respect to θ ∈ Θ,
w ew o u l do b t a i nt h es o l u t i o nt omaxθ∈Θ {minψ∈Ψ E[L0 (q(ψ,θ))]}, and not necessarily the parameter vector θ that
solves (3). The solution to both problems is however the same provided that it is part of a global NE. Our four-step
procedure guarantees that we obtain the robust policy rule that we are looking for, provided that a global NE exists.
10good, C
j














and Pt is the corresponding price index. The consumption index aggregates consumption of each
good, c
j
t (z), with an elasticity of substitution between goods, ϕt > 1, at each date. In contrast to
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) however, we let the elasticity of substitution vary exogenously over time.
As will appear more clearly below, such perturbations to the elasticity of substitution imply time
variation in the price elasticity of demand of each good, and variations of the desired markup. The
stationary vector ξt represents disturbances to preferences. For each value of ξ, the functions u(·;ξ)
and χ(·;ξ) are assumed to be increasing and concave, while the disutility from supplying goods,
v(·;ξ), is increasing and convex.












tdj represents aggregate demand at date t.
We assume that ﬁnancial markets are complete so that risks are eﬃciently shared. It follows
that all households face an identical intertemporal budget constraint, and choose identical state-
contingent plans for consumption, and money balances. We may therefore drop the index j on
those variables.
Each household maximizes (5) subject to its budget constraint, and the constraint that it satis-
ﬁes the demand for its good (7). It follows that the optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption














where it denotes the nominal interest rate on a riskless one-period nominal bond purchased in
period t. We will consider a log-linear approximation of this relationship about the steady state
where the exogenous disturbances take the values ξt =0and where there is no inﬂation. We
11let ¯ Y and ¯ ı be the constant values of output and nominal interest rate in that steady state, and









,π t ≡ log(Pt/Pt−1). The log-linear
approximation to (8) is
ˆ Yt =E tˆ Yt+1 − σ−1 (ˆ ıt − Etπt+1)+σ−1δt (9)
where σ ≡− ucc ¯ C









represents exogenous disturbances to (9). Equation (9), which represents the demand side of the
economy, is often called the “intertemporal IS equation” as it relates negatively desired expenditures
to the real interest rate. We assume that δt is independent of σ.10
Monetary policy has real eﬀects in this model because prices do not respond immediately to
perturbations. Speciﬁcally, we assume as in Calvo (1983) that only a fraction 1−α of suppliers may
change their prices at the end of any given period, regardless of the the time elapsed since the last
change. Because of monopolistic competition, each household chooses the optimal prices {pt (j)},
taking as given the evolution of aggregate demand and the price level, that determine the location
of the demand for its product (7). Each supplier that changes its price in period t chooses its new
price to maximize the present discounted value of its expected future proﬁts. Log-linearizing the
resulting ﬁrst-order conditions, we obtain the following aggregate supply equation
πt = κ
³




where κ>0, and ˆ Y n
t represents the natural rate of output, i.e., the percentage deviations from
steady-state of the level of output that would obtain with perfectly ﬂexible prices (see, e.g., Wood-















10This is true, for instance, for any utility function of the form u(C,ξ)=υ(C)·w(ξ) where υ and w are independent
of each other, since σ = −
υ00 ¯ C







12where ω>0 represents the elasticity of each ﬁrm’s real marginal cost with respect to its own
supply and μt represents percent deviations of the desired markup ϕt/(ϕt − 1) from steady state.
Note that while the natural rate of output depends upon both supply and demand exogenous real
perturbations, it is completely independent of monetary policy. Because of market power, however,
steady-state level of output is ineﬃciently low. As the percent deviations of the eﬃcient rate of
output – i.e., the equilibrium rate of output that would obtain in the absence of price rigidities and









, exogenous time variation in the desired
markup results in deviations of the eﬃcient rate of output from the natural rate given by
ˆ Y e





As we will evaluate monetary policy in terms of deviations of output from its eﬃcient level, it will
be convenient to deﬁne the “output gap” as
xt ≡ ˆ Yt − ˆ Y e
t . (13)
Using this, we can rewrite the two structural equations (9) and (11) as






















is an adverse “eﬃcient” supply shock. We suppose that the vector of shocks ut ≡ [δt,ε t,μ t]
0 satisﬁes
E(ut)=0 , and that these perturbations are independent of the parameters σ,κ, or ω.11
As in Giannoni (2000), we call the exogenous disturbance to the aggregate supply equation, μt,
an “ineﬃcient supply shock” since it represents a perturbation to the natural rate of output that is
11Again, εt is independent of ω if, for instance, the disutility of supplying goods is of the form v(y,ξ)= (y)·ν (ξ).
(See footnote 10.)
13not eﬃcient. While μt represents ﬂuctuations in the desired markup, this term may alternatively
represent variations in distortionary tax rates, or variations in the degree of market power of
workers. We prefer to call μt an “ineﬃcient supply shock” rather than a “cost-push shock” as
is often done in the literature (see, e.g., Clarida et al., 1999), because perturbations that aﬀect
inﬂation by changing costs may well change the eﬃcient rate of output as well as the natural rate
of output. It follows that cost shocks are represented in our model by changes in xt rather than μt.
Many recent studies have emphasized the role of the “natural” or “eﬃcient” rate of interest for
evaluating the stance of monetary policy (see, e.g., Blinder 1998, Woodford, 2003). The eﬃcient
rate of interest, i.e., the equilibrium real interest rate that would equate output to the eﬃcient rate
of output, ˆ Y e









Equation (14) can then be rewritten as
xt =E txt+1 − σ−1 (ˆ ıt − Etπt+1 − re
t). (17)
It is clear from (16) that the eﬃcient rate of interest depends both on demand shocks δt and eﬃcient
supply shocks εt. It follows from (17) that monetary policy is expansive or restrictive only insofar
as the equilibrium real interest rate is below or above the eﬃcient rate. If the central bank was
perfectly tracking the path of re
t, then the output gap would be zero at all times, and inﬂation
w o u l do n l yd e p e n do nﬂuctuations in μt.12
3.2 Monetary Policy










t + λx (xt − x∗)




12There is an additional ﬁrst-order condition that determines the optimal holdings of monetary balances as a
function of equilibrium consumption (or output), the nominal interest rate, and the price level. When monetary
policy determines the nominal interest rate, as is the case here, this condition can be omitted as it has no eﬀect on
the equilibrium values of inﬂation, output, and nominal interest rate. The presence of real balances in the utility
function (5) matters however for the determination of the loss function below.
14where λx,λ i > 0, are weights placed on the stabilization of the output gap and the nominal interest
rate, and where x∗ ≥ 0 represents some optimal level of the output gap. (Note that we implicitly
assume that the optimal levels of both inﬂation and the interest rate are zero). As in many studies
of monetary policy, we assume that the policymaker seeks to stabilize ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and
in the output gap. We furthermore assume that he also cares about the variability of the nominal
interest rate, as a result of transaction frictions. Friedman (1969) has argued that high nominal
interest rates involve welfare costs of transactions. Whenever the deadweight loss is a convex
function of the distortion, then it is desirable to reduce not only the level but also the variability of
the nominal interest rate (see Woodford, 1990, 2003). Such a loss criterion can ﬁnally obtained as
a second-order Taylor approximation to the utility function of the household’s lifetime utility (5) in
equilibrium, when the parameters are known with certainty. We will assume that the policymaker
minimizes the unconditional expectation of the above loss criterion, E[L0], where the expectation
is taken with respect to the stationary distribution of the shocks. As a result, optimal policy will
be independent of the initial state.
We characterize monetary policy in terms of interest-rate rules. Speciﬁcally, we assume that
the policymaker commits credibly at the beginning of period 0 to a feedback rule of the form
ˆ ıt = Pt (πt,πt−1,...,x t,x t−1,...,ˆ ıt−1,ˆ ıt−2,...,u t,u t−1,...) (19)
for each date t ≥ 0. The policymaker determines the functions Pt (·),t=0 ,1,2,... to minimize
the loss E[L0] subject to the structural equations (14) and (15). As the objective is quadratic and
the constraints are linear in all variables, we may without loss of generality restrict our attention
to linear functions Pt (·). Using the notation of section 2, we denote by ψ the ﬁnite-dimensional
vector of coeﬃcients that completely characterizes {Pt (·)}
∞
t=0 , and we call ψ a “policy rule”.
3.3 Calibration
The model considered here is very similar to a simpliﬁed version of the econometric model that
Rotemberg and Woodford (RW) (1997, 1999) have estimated for the US economy. The structural
equations in RW correspond to (9) and (11) only when conditioned upon information available
15two quarters earlier.13 We will use their estimates to calibrate our model, in the baseline case.
RW calibrate β, setting it at 0.99. They estimate σ = .1571,κ= .0238. The standard errors (se)
for these parameters are respectively 0.0328 and 0.0035. These numbers were computed for the
RW model using the estimation method explained in Amato and Laubach (2003).14 Finally, RW
calibrate ω, setting it at 0.4729. As we will consider uncertainty also about ω we will assume that
the standard error is 0.0946, corresponding to 20% of the calibrated value (which is approximately
in line with the uncertainty about σ and κ). We assume that the uncertainty about the critical
structural parameters is given by the approximate 95% intervals
[σ, ¯ σ]=[ σ − 2seσ,σ+2 seσ]=[ 0 .0915,0.2227]
[κ,¯ κ]=[ κ − 2seκ,κ+2 seκ]=[ 0 .0168,0.0308]
[ω, ¯ ω]=[ ω − 2seω,ω+2 seω]=[ 0 .2837,0.6621].
In Section 4.4, we consider the case in which there is much more uncertainty about these parameters,
so that these intervals are considerably wider. For simplicity, we assume that β is known with
certainty. We now turn to the calibration of the variance-covariance matrix of the exogenous
disturbances. RW estimate the process for the exogenous variables ˆ Gt, ˆ Y S
t in their model. This


























¯ Zt = B ¯ Zt−1 + U¯ et
13When conditioning both the intertemporal IS equation and the aggregate supply equation in RW (1997) upon
information available at t − 2, we obtain
Et−2Yt =E t−2Yt+1 − σ
−1Et−2
³




ˆ Gt − ˆ Gt+1
´
Et−2ˆ πt = κEt−2
³





where Yt, ˆ πt, ˆ Rt represent respectively output, inﬂation, and the nominal interest rate expressed as percentage de-
viations from steady state in RW (1997), and where ˆ Gt is an exogenous variable representing autonomous changes
in demand, and ˆ Y
S
t represents exogenous disturbances to the aggregate supply equation. Deﬁning ˆ Yt ≡ EtYt+2,
πt ≡ Etˆ πt+2, ˆ ıt ≡ Et ˆ Rt+2,σ
−1 ucξ
uc ξt ≡ Et ˆ Gt+2, and ˆ Y
n
t ≡ Et ˆ Y
S
t+2, we obtain (9) and (11).
14I am grateful to Thomas Laubach for providing me with these numbers.
16where Et¯ et+j =0for all j>0, and the variance-covariance matrix of the state vector ¯ Zt is Ω.
The variables Et ˆ Gt+2 and Etˆ Y S
t+2 in their model correspond respectively to σ−1 ucξ
uc ξt and ˆ Y n
t in our
model. It follows that the process for δt is given by
δt = σEt
³
ˆ Gt+2 − ˆ Gt+3
´
= σc1
¡ ¯ Zt − Et ¯ Zt+1
¢
= σc1 (I − B) ¯ Zt.
Let us deﬁne the supply shock




We know from (12) that st =
ucξ
uc ξt − (ω + σ) ˆ Y n
t . It follows from the above equations that
st = σEt ˆ Gt+2 − (ω + σ)E tˆ Y S
t+2
= h ¯ Zt
where h ≡ σc1 − (ω + σ)c2. While we can characterize the process for st, we don’t have enough
information to determine the split between the eﬃcient component
vyξ
vy ξt, and the ineﬃcient supply
shock μt. We therefore simply assume that μt = νst and
vyξ
vy ξt =( 1− ν)st, where ν is some constant
between 0 and 1. It follows that the processes for the two supply shocks are given by
εt =( 1− ν)h
¡ ¯ Zt − Et ¯ Zt+1
¢
=( 1− ν)h(I − B) ¯ Zt,
and
μt = νh¯ Zt.








⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
σc1 (I − B)
(1 − ν)h(I − B)
νh
⎤




⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
σc1 (I − B)
(1 − ν)h(I − B)
νh
⎤




17We will compute the covariance matrix for diﬀerent values of ν. Below we will consider uncertainty
about ν, knowing only that ν lies between 0 and 1.15 Finally, we will assume that the three exoge-
nous shocks follow an AR(1) process, with coeﬃcients of serial correlation of ρδ,ρ ε,ρ μ. Woodford
(1999) argues that the coeﬃcient of autocorrelation of the natural rate of interest is 0.35. We will
consider as a benchmark the case in which ρδ = ρε = ρμ =0 .35, but we will also consider the case
in which there is uncertainty about the coeﬃcients of autocorrelation, allowing their values to be
anywhere in the [0,0.8] interval. The benchmark parameters are summarized in Table 1.
4 Robust Optimality within a Flexible Class of Interest-Rate Rules
We now turn to the characterization of optimal monetary policy within a ﬂexible class of interest-





ˆ ıt = ψππt + ψx (xt − xt−1)+ψi1ˆ ıt−1 + ψi2ˆ ıt−2 (21)
at all dates t ≥ 0.16 As will become clear below, the set ˜ Ψ is ﬂexible enough to include a fully
optimal rule in the case of any parameter vector θ ∈ Θ (if the parameters were known with
certainty), though it is still speciﬁc enough to contain only one rule consistent with the optimal
plan in any such case. Moreover this class of rules includes recent descriptions of actual monetary
policy such as the one proposed by Judd and Rudebusch (1998). We start with the characterization
of the optimal plan for a given θ, and propose an interest-rate rule that implements that plan. We
next determine the minmax equilibrium, and the robust optimal policy rule that implements it.
15The assumption that both μt and
vyξ
vy ξt are proportional to st may seem unappealing as it implies that these
variables are perfectly correlated, as long as 0 <ν<1. However, as we will see below, once we consider uncertainty
about ν, the variance-covariance matrix of ut that matters is actually either the one for which ν =0or the one for
which ν =1 .
16As we evaluate monetary policy regardless of speciﬁc initial conditions, the policy rule is assumed to be inde-
pendent of the values the endogenous variables might have taken before it was implemented. Speciﬁcally, we assume
that the policymaker considers the initial values as satisfying i−2 = i−1 = x−1 =0 , whether they actually do or not.
Equivalently, we could assume that the policy rule satisﬁes i0 = ψππ0 +ψxx0,i 1 = ψππ1 +ψx (x1 − x0)+ψi1i0, and
(21) at all dates t ≥ 2.
184.1 Optimal Plan with Given Parameters
To characterize the optimal plan for a given parameter vector θ ∈ Θ, we determine the stochastic
process q∗ (θ) of endogenous variables that minimizes the unconditional expectation of the loss
criterion (18) subject to the constraints (14) and (15) at all dates t ≥ 0, a n di ne v e r ys t a t et h a t
may occur at date t, i.e., for every possible history of the disturbances until that date. In terms
of the notation laid out in section 2, we determine the stochastic process q∗ (θ) that minimizes the
loss ˆ L(q) subject to the restrictions (1) imposed by the structural equations (14) and (15). The
policymaker’s Lagrangian can be written as
L =E
(






t + λx (xt − x∗)

























The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions with respect to πt,x t, and ˆ ıt are
πt − (βσ)
−1 φ1t−1 + φ2t − φ2t−1 =0 (23)
λx (xt − x∗)+φ1t − β−1φ1t−1 − κφ2t =0 (24)
λiˆ ıt + σ−1φ1t =0 (25)
at each date t ≥ 0, and for each possible state. In addition, we have the initial conditions
φ1,−1 = φ2,−1 =0 (26)
indicating that the policymaker has no previous commitment at time 0. Note that since the
objective function is convex in q, and the constraints are linear in q, (14), (15), and (23) — (25)
at all dates t, together with the initial condition (26) are not only necessary but also suﬃcient to
determine the bounded optimal plan {πt,x t,ˆ ıt,φ 1t,φ 2t}. In the steady-state, i.e., in the absence of
perturbations, (14), (15), and (23) — (26) reveal that the endogenous variables remain constant at
19the values









It will be convenient to replace φ2t with ˆ φ2t ≡ φ2t − φ
op
2 so that the constant drops out of (24).
Using (25) to substitute for the interest rate, we can rewrite the dynamic system (14), (15), (23),

















⎦ + mut, (27)
where zt ≡ [πt,x t]




,u t ≡ [δt,ε t,μ t]
0 , and M and m are matrices of coeﬃcients.
Following Blanchard and Kahn (1980), this dynamic system has a unique bounded solution (given
a bounded process {ut}) if and only if the matrix M has exactly two eigenvalues outside the unit
circle. Investigation of the matrix M reveals that if a bounded solution exists, it is unique.17 In
this case the solution for the endogenous variables can be expressed as




where qt ≡ [πt,x t,ˆ ıt]
0 , and the Lagrange multipliers follow the law of motion




for some matrices D, N, dj,n j that depend upon the parameters of the model. Woodford (1999)
has emphasized that in the optimal plan with given structural parameters, the endogenous variables
should depend not only upon expected future values of the disturbances, but also upon the prede-
termined variables φt−1. This dependence indicates that optimal monetary policy should involve
inertia in the interest rate, regardless of the possible inertia in the exogenous perturbations. In fact,
as argued by Woodford (1999), policymakers who choose optimal actions by disregarding their past
17The matrix M has two eigenvalues with modulus greater than β
−1/2 and two with modulus smaller than this.
20actions and past states of the economy, don’t achieve the best equilibrium when the private sector
is forward-looking. The central bank should realize that the evolution of its goal variables depends
not only upon its current actions, but also upon how the private sector foresees future monetary
policy. It should therefore act in a way that aﬀects the response of the private sector appropriately.
As will become clearer below, it can do so by committing itself to a rule of the kind (21).
Figure 1 plots with solid lines the optimal response of the interest rate, inﬂation, and the output
gap to an unexpected demand shock, in the baseline calibration.18 The disturbance δt unexpectedly
increases by 1 at date 0 and is expected to return to steady state following an AR(1) process with a
coeﬃcient of autocorrelation of ρδ =0 .35. The path that the eﬃcient rate of interest (16) is expected
follow is indicated by the dashed-dotted line in the upper panel. Similar impulse responses would be
generated by an adverse eﬃcient supply shock, i.e., an increase in εt. While the policymaker could
in principle completely stabilize the output gap and inﬂation, by tracking the path of the eﬃcient
rate of interest, it is optimal to increase the nominal interest rate by less than the eﬃcient rate
of interest at the period of the shock because the policymaker also wants to dampen ﬂuctuations
in the nominal rate of interest. As monetary policy is relatively expansionary, inﬂation and the
output gap increase in response to the perturbation. The short-term interest is also more inertial
than the eﬃcient rate. Inertia in monetary policy is especially desirable here because it induces
the private sector to expect future negative output gaps which in turn have a disinﬂationary eﬀect.
Therefore, by acting in an inertial way, the policymaker can oﬀset the inﬂationary impact of the
shock without having to raise the short-term interest much. Qualitatively similar ﬁgures would be
obtained for diﬀerent degrees of serial correlation in the perturbations.
Figure 2 displays with solid lines the optimal response of the endogenous variables to an un-
expected ineﬃcient supply shock μt. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the desired markup increases
unexpectedly by one percentage point at date 0, and is expected to return to steady-state accord-
ing to AR(1) process with coeﬃcient of autocorrelation ρμ =0 .35. Figure 2 reveals that it is optimal
to slightly raise the nominal interest rate. This helps maintaining the output gap (and output since
there is no change in ˆ Y e
t ) below steady state for several periods. As a result, the private sector
18The impulse responses of all variables are reported in annual terms. Therefore, the responses of ˆ ıt and πt are
multiplied by 4.
21expects a slight deﬂa t i o ni nt h ef u t u r e ,w h i c hr e m o v e ss o m ei n ﬂationary pressure already at the
time of the shock.
4.2 Optimal Interest-Rate Rule with Given Parameters
We now turn to the determination of an optimal interest rate rule, namely the policy rule in the
family (21) that implements the optimal plan, for given structural parameters θ. We solve (25) for















ˆ ıt−1 − β−1ˆ ıt−2 (30)



















satisﬁes the restrictions P(q∗ (θ),ψ∗ (θ)) = 0. Furthermore, since the endogenous variables entering
(30) minimize the loss criterion ˆ L(q) subject to the constraints (1) in the optimal plan, the following
lemma guarantees that ψ∗ (θ) is an optimal rule for any given θ ∈ Θ, provided that it results in a
unique bounded equilibrium.
Lemma 4 Suppose that q∗ (θ) minimizes ˆ L(q) subject to (1) for any given θ ∈ Θ, and that there
exists ψ∗ (θ) ∈ Ψ that solves P(q∗ (θ),ψ∗ (θ)) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. Then ψ∗ (θ) ∈ argminψ∈Ψ L(ψ,θ).
Proof. F i r s tn o t et h a ts i n c eψ∗ (θ) ∈ Ψ, the latter policy rule results in a unique bounded
equilibrium. Suppose as a way of contradiction that there exists a policy rule ψ† (θ) ∈ Ψ,ψ † (θ) 6=




<L(ψ∗ (θ),θ). By deﬁnition of L(·) and ˆ L(·) we have L(ψ,θ)=






< ˆ L(q(ψ∗ (θ),θ)) = ˆ L(q∗ (θ)). But then
q∗ (θ) cannot minimize ˆ L(q) subject to (1).
19See remarks in footnote 16.
22The dynamic system obtained by combining (14), (15), and (30), has the property of system
(27) that, if any bounded solution exists, it is unique.20 Moreover it can be shown, at least in the
baseline parametrization, and for all values θ ∈ Θ of our example, that ψ∗ (θ) is the unique optimal
policy rule in the set ˜ Ψ (see Appendix B1 in Giannoni, 2000).
Notice that this rule makes no reference to any of the exogenous shocks. It achieves the minimal
loss regardless of the processes that describe the evolution of δt,ε t, and μt, provided that the latter
processes are stationary (bounded).21 If we would allow for a broader class of policy rules than
˜ Ψ, other interest-rate feedback rules may implement the same optimal plan. Woodford (1999),
for example, proposes a rule in which the interest rate depends upon current and lagged values of
the inﬂation rate as well as lagged interest rates in a similar model in which there is no ineﬃcient
supply shock. While his rule makes no reference to the output gap, it is dependent upon the driving
process of the eﬃcient rate of interest.
Equation (30) indicates that to implement the optimal plan, the central bank should relate
the interest rate positively to ﬂuctuations in current inﬂation, in changes of the output gap, and
in lagged interest rates. While it is doubtful that the policymaker knows the current level of the
output gap with great accuracy, the change in the output gap may be known with greater precision.
For example, Orphanides (2003) shows that subsequent revisions of U.S. output gap estimates have
been quite large (sometimes as large as 5.6 percentage points), while revisions of estimates of the
quarterly change in the output gap have been much smaller.
Note ﬁnally that the interest rate should not only be inertial in the sense of being positively
related to past values of the interest rate, it should be super-inertial, as the lagged polynomial for








L+β−1L2 =( 1− z1L)(1 − z2L)
involves a root z1 > 1 while the other root z2 ∈ (0,1). A reaction greater than one of the interest rate
to its lagged value has initially been found by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) to be a desirable
20The eigenvalues of this system are the same as the eigenvalues of M in (27) plus one eigenvalue equal to zero. As
there is one predetermined variable more than in (27), this system yields a unique bounded equilibrium, if it exists.
21See Giannoni and Woodford (2002, 2003) for the characterization of policy rules which are optimal regardless of
the shock processes in the context of more general models.
23feature of a good policy rule in their econometric model with optimizing agents. As explained
further in Woodford (2003), it is precisely such a super-inertial policy rule that the policymaker
should follow to bring about the optimal responses to shocks when economic agents are forward-
looking. Because of a root larger than one, the optimal policy requires an explosively growing
response of the interest rate to deviations of inﬂation and the output gap from target.22
This is illustrated in Figure 3 which displays the response of the interest rate to a sustained
1 percent deviation in inﬂation (upper panel) or the output gap (lower panel) from target. In
each panel, the solid line represents the optimal response in the baseline case. The corresponding
coeﬃcients of the optimal policy rule are reported in the upper panel of Table 2 (lines indicated
by ψ0). For comparison, the lower panel of Table 2 reports the coeﬃcients derived from Judd
and Rudebusch’s (1998) estimation of actual Fed reaction functions between 1987:3 and 1997:4.23
Table 2 reveals that the estimated historical rule in the baseline case involves only slightly smaller
responses to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and the output gap than the optimal rule. However the
estimated response to lagged values of the interest rate is sensibly smaller that the optimal one.
As a result, the estimated historical rule involves a non-explosive response of the interest rate to a
sustained deviation in inﬂation or the output gap, represented by the dashed-dotted lines in Figure
3.











of the endogenous variables π, x and ˆ ı, for the various policy rules and parameter conﬁgurations.
The statistic V[z] determines the contribution of each endogenous variable to the loss E[L0], as
the latter measure is a weighted sum of V[π], V[x], and V[ ˆ ı] with weights corresponding to those
of the loss function (18).24 The lines of Table 2 indicated by θ0 report statistics evaluated using the
22Interestingly, the rules preferred by Levin et al. (1999), while not super-inertial, involve a coeﬃcient near unity
on the lagged interest rate.
23The estimated historical policy rule refers to regression A for the Greenspan period in Judd and Rudebusch
(1998).
24All statistics in Table 2 are expressed in annual terms. The statistics V[π], V[ ˆ ı], and E[L0] are therefore
multiplied by 16. Furthermore, the weight λx reported in Table 1 is also multiplied by 16 in order to represent the
weight attributed to output gap variability (in annual terms) relative to the variability of annualized inﬂation and of
the annualized interest rate.
24baseline parametrization. This table indicates to what extent the optimal rule results in a lower
loss than the estimated historical rule.
While optimal policy would involve an explosive behavior of the interest rate in the face of
a sustained deviation of inﬂation or the output gap, such a policy is perfectly consistent with a
stationary rational expectations equilibrium, and a low variability of the interest rate in equilibrium.
(In Table 2, V[ ˆ ı] is always smaller when the interest rate is set according to the optimal ﬂexible
rule, than when it is set according to the estimated historical rule.) In fact, the interest rate does
not explode in equilibrium because (as appears clearly in Figures 1 and 2) the current and expected
future optimal levels of the interest rate are suﬃcient to counteract the eﬀects of an initial deviation
in inﬂation and the output gap by generating subsequent deviations with the opposite sign of these
variables.
4.3 Robust Optimal Policy in the Presence of Parameter Uncertainty
So far we have assumed that all parameters are known with certainty. We now determine the
robust optimal policy rule that obtains when the policymaker faces uncertainty about the three
structural parameters σ, κ,a n dω, the degrees of serial correlation of the exogenous perturbations
ρδ,ρ ε,ρ μ, and the parameter ν describing the importance of the ineﬃcient supply shocks. We
consider uncertainty about the parameter vector θ =
£
σ,κ,ω,ρδ,ρ ε,ρ μ,ν





, where the extent of uncertainty for σ, κ, and ω is given by the approximate 95%
conﬁdence intervals mentioned in section 3.3, and reported in Table 1.25 We assume that the
coeﬃcients of autocorrelation lie in the [0,0.8] interval,26 and we allow ν to lie anywhere in the
[0,1] interval. We assume that the preference parameters of the policymaker, λx and λi, are known
to the policymakers, and are kept ﬁxed regardless of the values of the structural parameters, for
simplicity and because we view it as plausible that policymakers know their preferences despite the
25While the elasticities σ and ω are directly related to the underlying microeconomic foundations of the model, the
parameter κ is a composite of structural parameters such as the degree of price rigidity α, the elasticity of substitution
across goods. Since these parameters matter for welfare only through their eﬀect on κ, and since the same aggregate
supply equation can be derived with alternative microeconomic foundations, we ﬁnd it more general to consider
uncertainty about the parameter κ rather than some of its components.
26Alternative intervals yield similar results. It is important for our methodology, however, that the interval of
uncertainty be closed.
25fact that they don’t know the true model.27
In the previous section, we have characterized the optimal equilibrium for any given parame-
ter vector θ. Following the solution method summarized in section 2, we need to determine the
candidate worst-case parameter vector, i.e., the parameter vector θ∗ that obtains in the candidate
minmax equilibrium. Once the worst-case parameter vector is identiﬁed, it will be straightforward
to determine the robust optimal rule.
4.3.1 Worst-Case Parameter Vector and Minmax Equilibrium
We now determine the worst-case parameter vector θ∗, i.e., the vector θ that maximizes the loss
function ˆ L(q∗ (θ)) on the constraint set Θ, or in other words the vector determining the minmax
equilibrium q∗ (θ∗). For any parameter vector θ ∈ Θ, the structural equations (14), (15) and the
ﬁrst-order conditions (23) — (25) can be written in matrix form, as in (27), and standard methods
can be applied to get the solution of the form (28) — (29). As in the certainty case, the bounded
solution is unique if one exists. Equations (28) — (29) can then be used to compute the loss
ˆ L(q∗ (θ)). Maximizing this loss function with respect to θ ∈ Θ, we obtain:
θ∗ =
£
σ, ¯ κ,ω,¯ ρδ,ρ ε,¯ ρμ,¯ ν
¤0 (32)
=[ 0 .0915,0.0308,0.2837,0.8,−,0.8,1].
Note that ρε may take any value in the allowed interval [0,1], since the loss is maximized when
ν∗ =1 , i.e., when there are no eﬃcient supply shocks. We performed the maximization of ˆ L(q∗ (θ))
numerically starting from a large number of diﬀerent initial values for θ, including values close to
the boundaries of the set Θ. There are a few local maxima, but none of them yields a loss higher
than the one implied by the parameter vector reported above.
The minmax equilibrium involves very persistent shocks in the more general model of the
previous sections. Indeed, the worst-case values for the coeﬃcients of serial correlations are equal
27Alternatively, if the policymaker’s loss function is interpreted strictly as a second-order approximation to the
expected utility of the representative household in the underlying microeconomic model, and there is no uncer-
tainty about how the model relates to the policymaker’s preferences, the parameters λx and λi are related to the
model’s structural parameters. As a result uncertainty about the underlying model parameters should translate into
uncertainty about λx and λi. Kurozumi (2003) and Walsh (2005) consider such a case.
26to the upper bound 0.8. Note that this is true even though the variance-covariance matrix of the
shocks (20) is given, and independent of ρδ,ρ ε, and ρμ.
To get some intuition about the worst-case parameter values for σ, κ, and ω, we consider
temporarily a simple case in which monetary policy is assumed to be non-inertial – i.e., it does
not depend on lagged variables – and all shocks are i.i.d. In this case, all future variables are
expected to remain at steady state in equilibrium (Etxt+1 =E tπt+1 =0 ), so that the two structural
equations (14) and (15) reduce to















These two equations are represented by respectively the lines IS and AS in Figures 4a to 4c.
Figure 4a represents the eﬀects of a unit exogenous increase in δt. In the case in which the
parameters are known with certainty, the IS curve shifts vertically from IS(σ0,ω0) to IS0 (σ0,ω0),
by an amount ω0
ω0+σ0. The policymaker faces a trade-oﬀ between the stabilization of inﬂation and
the output gap on one hand, and the interest rate on the other hand. He could completely stabilize
inﬂation and the output gap by raising the interest rate by ω0
ω0+σ0. Such a policy is however not
optimal as the policymaker also cares about ﬂuctuations in the interest rate (see loss function (18)).
He acts optimally by increasing the interest rate to some level i0
t, and letting the output gap increase
to x0
t. In the lower panel of the ﬁgure, inﬂation rises to π0
t. In the presence of parameter uncertainty
and a demand shock, the worst case is obtained when σ is as low as possible, and ω is as high as
possible, so that σ∗ = σ and ω∗ =¯ ω. As (33) reveals, it is in this case that a given increase increase
in δt results in the highest possible upward shift of the IS curve. Furthermore, as this implies a
ﬂatter IS curve, the output gap increases by more, for given nominal interest rate. On the supply
side, the worst value for κ is obtained when κ∗ =¯ κ, so that any given change in the output gap is
associated with a large change in inﬂation. It follows that the policymaker who seeks to minimize
the loss in the worst-case parameter conﬁguration optimally sets the interest rate above i0
t in the
presence of uncertainty, in order to contain the increase both in the output gap and in inﬂation.28
28The fact that the nominal interest rate rises above i
0
t in the presence of uncertainty does not necessarily mean that
27Figure 4b shows that the eﬀects of a unit exogenous increase in εt are qualitatively similar to
those of a shock to δt when parameters are known with certainty. Note that it is the IS and not the
AS schedule that shifts following an eﬃcient supply shock. The IS schedule shifts upwards to IS’
by an amount σ0
ω0+σ0. However, in the presence of parameter uncertainty, the worst-case value for ω
is ω, because it generates the largest shift of the IS schedule. As before, the worst-case value for κ
is ¯ κ, so that a given non-zero output gap results in the largest change in inﬂation. It is however not
trivial to determine a priori the worst-case value for σ. Whether σ∗ is σ, ¯ σ, or any value in between
depends on the parameter values. For the calibration of Table 1, it is ¯ σ, as this is the value which
is responsible for the largest upward shift of IS, even though it implies a steeper IS schedule.
Figure 4c illustrates the eﬀects of an ineﬃcient supply shock, which shifts the AS curve from
AS (κ0) up to AS0 (κ0), in the absence of parameter uncertainty. The policymaker faces a trade-oﬀ
between the stabilization of inﬂation on one hand, and the output gap on the other hand. He acts
optimally by raising the interest rate to some level i0
t, so that the output gap decreases to x0
t, and
inﬂation increases to π0
t. In the presence of parameter uncertainty, the worst-case slope of the AS
curve is again obtained when κ∗ =¯ κ, and the horizontal shift of the AS curve is largest when
σ∗ = σ, and ω∗ = ω. In the upper panel, however, we notice that the worst slope of the IS curve
obtains when σ∗ =¯ σ, so that the policymaker needs to increase the interest rate by more, to obtain
a given change in the output gap.
To summarize, while the worst-case value for κ is ¯ κ regardless of the shock considered, the
worst-case parameter values for σ and ω depend in general on the parametrization of the model,
and the relative importance of the disturbances. For the parametrization summarized in Table 1,
the worst-case parameter conﬁguration involves σ∗ = σ and ω∗ = ω in the model considered.
4.3.2 Robust Optimal Policy Rule
Following the solution procedure reviewed in section 2, once the worst-case parameter vector θ∗
has been determined, we characterize the robust optimal policy rule simply by looking at the best
response ψ∗ (θ∗) to this vector, assuming that a global NE does exist. As (31) is the best response
the policy rule involves larger responses to variables such as inﬂation and the output gap, since the latter variables
may increase too. However, we know from (30) that the robust optimal rule requires larger responses to ﬂuctuations
in inﬂation and the output gap when the worst-case values for σ and κ are respectively σ and ¯ κ.














ˆ ıt−1 − β−1ˆ ıt−2. (35)
The couple (ψ∗,θ∗) constitutes at least a local NE, and the policy rule satisfying (35) is a robust
optimal policy rule, provided that a global NE exists.
In accordance with step 4 of our solution procedure, we verify that the couple (ψ∗,θ∗) is also
a global NE. We do so by maximizing the loss function L(ψ∗,θ) ≡ E[L0 (q(ψ∗,θ))] numerically
with respect to θ ∈ Θ. This loss function results from the equilibrium obtained by combining the
structural equations (14), (15) for any given θ, and the candidate robust optimal policy rule ψ∗
satisfying (35). We repeated the maximization many times, starting each time from a diﬀerent
initial values for θ. We obtained again that the vector θ∗ deﬁned in (32) maximizes this loss
function. It follows that by choosing θ∗, malevolent Nature best-responds to the policy rule ψ∗,
and that (ψ∗,θ∗) is indeed a global NE. Because θ∗ is the only equilibrium parameter vector, and
ψ∗ ≡ ψ∗ (θ∗) is the unique best response to θ∗ in the set ˜ Ψ, the proﬁle (ψ∗,θ∗) constitutes the
unique global NE, and ψ∗ is the unique robust optimal policy rule in the class ˜ Ψ.
Denoting by σ0 ∈ (σ, ¯ σ) and κ0 ∈ (κ, ¯ κ) the parameter values in the absence of model uncer-
tainty, and noting that σ <σ 0 and κ0 < ¯ κ, one observes, by comparing (30) and (35) that the
policymaker reacts more strongly to perturbations to inﬂation, changes in the output gap, and the
lagged interest rate than is the case in the absence of uncertainty. To give a sense of the magnitude
of optimal policy coeﬃcients, we report in the middle panel of Table 2 the robust optimal rule (35)
(lines indicated by ψ∗), in addition to the optimal policy rule (30) in the certainty case (lines ψ0).
The lagged polynomial for the interest rate can be written as
Baseline :1 − 2.163L + 1.010L2 =( 1− 1.481L)(1 − .682L)
Robust :1 − 2.350L + 1.010L2 =( 1− 1.784L)(1 − .566L).
As the larger root is even greater in the presence of uncertainty, the interest rate is super-inertial
to an even greater extent when the central bank follows the robust optimal rule. As illustrated
29in Figure 3, the robust optimal rule (dashed line) involves (i) a larger response to a sustained
increase in inﬂation, at every time, (ii) a larger response to a sustained increase in the output gap,
at every time, and (iii) a faster asymptotic rate of explosion of both of these responses (thus a
greater degree to which the policy rule is super-inertial). But again, the presence of a root larger
than one is consistent with a stationary rational expectations equilibrium. This is illustrated for
instance by the dashed lines in Figures 1 and 2, which represent the impulse responses of the
endogenous variables when the policymaker follows the robust optimal policy rule (but when the
true parameters are those of the baseline calibration).
4.4 Sensitivity of Robust Policy to Alternative Assumptions
We just argued that the robust optimal policy rule involves larger responses of the interest rate
to endogenous variables. Equation (35) indicates however that the robust optimal rule depends
critically on the worst-case values for σ and κ. While the parameters ω,ρδ,ρ ε,ρ μ,ν don’t enter
directly the policy rule (35), they may still have an indirect eﬀect by aﬀecting the worst-case values
for σ and κ. To get a sense of how robust our conclusions are, we consider alternative assumptions
about the uncertainty surrounding the structural parameters.
4.4.1 Robust Policy with Little Uncertainty
As discussed in section 4.3.1, the worst-case value for κ remains the upper bound ¯ κ regardless of the
importance of the shocks considered, and the values of the other structural parameters – at least
when monetary policy is non-inertial. This induces the policymaker to let the interest rate react
more strongly to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and lagged interest rates, in the presence of parameter
uncertainty. The story is potentially more complicated for the parameter σ. For the calibration
summarized in Table 1, though, the worst-case value is σ. Figure 5 indicates that ¯ κ and σ remain
the worst-case values for κ and σ, under alternative assumptions about ω and the degree of serial
correlation of the perturbations, ρ, when ν is maintained at its worst-case value ν∗ =1 .T h i sﬁgure
represents contour plots of the loss criterion E[L0] as a function of the parameters κ and σ, when
monetary policy is conducted according to the robust optimal rule (35). These contour plots are
produced for various values of ω and ρ, and we report the cases in which ω is respectively ω, the
30baseline value ω0, and ¯ ω, and ρ is respectively 0, 0.35, and 0.8. The star in each plot indicates the
baseline values for σ and κ. The ﬁgure reveals that the worst-case couple (κ∗,σ∗) – indicated by
a circled star – is in each case in the lower right corner, i.e., (¯ κ,σ). Similar results are obtained
for alternative values for ω and ρ, and for alternative values of ν, provided that ν is larger than a
critical value around 0.5. This suggests that the robust optimal rule is not aﬀected by alternative
assumptions about ω and ρ, as long as the maximum value allowed for ν, i.e., ¯ ν is large enough.
However, if ¯ ν is suﬃciently small – so that most supply shocks are known to be mostly eﬃcient
supply shocks εt – then the worst-case value for σ may be ¯ σ, as argued in subsection 4.3.1. For
instance, if ν is constrained to lie in the interval [0,0.3], then the worst-case value for ν turns out
to be its lower bound 0. It follows that the worst case value for σ is ¯ σ. In this case, the response
to ﬂuctuations in the output gap would be smaller in the presence of uncertainty than in the
certainty case, as λx (λi¯ σ)
−1 <λ x (λiσ0)
−1 . Whether the robust rule responds more to ﬂuctuations
in inﬂation and in the lagged interest rate depends in the end on the amount of uncertainty about κ
relative to the one about σ. In our numerical example, if the worst case value for σ is ¯ σ, it appears
from (35) that the response coeﬃcients to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and the lagged interest rate are
also smaller in the presence of uncertainty, since ¯ κ/¯ σ =0 .0308/0.2227 < 0.0238/0.1571 = κ0/σ0.
To summarize, the robust optimal policy rule (35) does not depend on ω,ν and the coeﬃcients
of serial correlation of the shocks, provided that the uncertainty about ν is such that ¯ ν is large
enough. However, if ¯ ν is constrained to be suﬃciently small, then the worst-case value for σ is ¯ σ,
and the robust optimal rule is less aggressive than the optimal rule absent parameter uncertainty.
4.4.2 Robust Policy with Large Uncertainty about σ,κ,ω
The analysis has so far assumed that the uncertainty about the critical parameters σ,κ,ω, is
bounded by an estimate of their respective 95% conﬁdence intervals. The degree of parameter un-
certainty assumed might however be considered as relatively small. To check further the robustness
of our results, we consider an alternative calibration of the amount of uncertainty by allowing the
31intervals to be considerably larger. Speciﬁcally, we assume
[σ, ¯ σ]=[ 0 .05,1] (36)
[κ, ¯ κ]=[ 0 .01,0.5] (37)
[ω, ¯ ω]=[ 0 .1,1]. (38)
We repeat the steps laid down in section 2. For this alternative calibration, we ﬁnd again that the
worst-case parameter conﬁguration involves σ∗ = σ,κ ∗ =¯ κ and ω∗ = ω. The robust optimal policy
rule is thus again of the form (35).
By how much the policymaker should let the interest rate respond to ﬂuctuations of inﬂation,
the output gap and past values of the interest rate actually depends on the particular degree of
uncertainty assumed, in particular on the values attributed to ¯ κ and σ. In any case, the qualitative
result remains the same: in the face of uncertainty about the structural parameters, the robust
optimal rule involves larger responses of the interest rate to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation, output gap
and lagged interest rate, than is the case in the absence of uncertainty, and that response is larger
the higher ¯ κ and the lower σ.
4.5 Welfare Comparisons
In the model considered, the worst-case parameter vector lies at the boundary of the relevant set.29
Such a parameter conﬁguration may thus be viewed as very unlikely, compared to other parameter
conﬁgurations. One may thus not ﬁnd it attractive to adopt a policy rule that is optimal only in
some unlikely situation. It is important to remember, however, that the robust policy rule is not
optimal for any arbitrary unlikely parameter vector. By being optimal for the worst-case situation,
it guarantees that the losses encountered will not be “too” large.
To get a sense of the beneﬁts and costs of adopting a robust optimal rule, we compare in
Figures 6-10 its welfare implications assuming diﬀerent parameter situations. Figure 6 compares the
performance of the robust optimal rule ψ∗ and the rule that is optimal in the absence of parameter
29While this does not always need to be the case in the context of parameter uncertainty (see, e.g., Giannoni,
2002), analyses of unstructured uncertainty al aHansen and Sargent (2005) do involve a worst-case scenario on the
boundary of the set of relevant models.
32uncertainty (ψ0) both in the baseline case
¡
θ0¢
and in the worst-case parameter conﬁguration (θ∗).
Each panel plots the loss as a function of one parameter, keeping the remaining parameters either at
their baseline or their worst-case value. The ﬁgure reveals that the welfare losses are much larger for
the worst-case parametrization than in the benchmark case, regardless of the policy rule adopted.
While both rules result in almost identical losses in the baseline calibration (θ0), it appears that
the robust rule performs marginally better than the baseline rule when the parameters are close
to their worst-case value.30 Note however from Table 2 that both ψ0 and ψ∗ perform signiﬁcantly
better than the estimated historical rule.
Even though the overall welfare losses are broadly similar with the robust optimal rule ψ∗ and
the optimal rule absent model uncertainty (ψ0), Figures 7-9 show that the policy rules have very
diﬀerent implications for the volatility of inﬂation, the output gap and the nominal interest rate.
The robust optimal policy brings about a lower variability of inﬂa t i o nt h a nt h er u l eψ0, but it is
responsible for a larger volatility of the output gap and the nominal interest rate than the rule ψ0.
Thus, in the model considered, the robust rule is one that guards mostly against inﬂation volatility.
Figure 6 displayed modest welfare gain from the robust optimal rule. This is however due to
the relatively small degree of uncertainty is assumed about the parameters κ and σ. If instead, we
assume that σ,κ,ω lie in the larger intervals given by (36) — (38), we observe from Figure 10 that
the robust optimal rule described in the subsection 4.4.2 achieves much lower welfare losses than
the rule ψ0 for parameter conﬁgurations not even close from the worst-case situation. In contrast,
around the baseline calibration, the robust optimal rule’s welfare performance is only marginally
worse than the one of ψ0. It should be clear from this example, that when the degree of parameter
uncertainty is suﬃciently large, the beneﬁts of following the robust rule dominate the costs.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have characterized a robust optimal policy rule in a simple forward-looking
model, when the policymaker faces uncertainty about the parameters of the structural model and
30The ﬁgure also reveals that if all elements of θ with the exception of one, reach their worst-case values at the
respective values in θ
∗, then the remaining element of θ also maximizes the loss at the corresponding value in θ
∗.
This illustrates the fact that θ
∗ is a best response on the part of malevolent Nature to the robust rule ψ
∗.
33the nature of the shock processes. We have derived the structural model from ﬁrst principles to
determine precisely how the exogenous perturbations are transmitted to the endogenous variables.
The optimal policy rule considered here has a number of advantages with respect to simpler
policy rules such as the Taylor rule. First, as it implements the optimal plan in the absence
of parameter uncertainty, it achieves the lowest possible loss, and hence performs better than
restricted policy rules.31 Second, the analytical characterization of the optimal rule allows us to
identify to what extent the policy rule is sensitive to particular parameters. While the optimal
Taylor rule derived in Giannoni (2002) depends critically on the characteristics of the exogenous
shock processes, the optimal rule proposed here does not depend them, in the absence of parameter
uncertainty. The invariance to various speciﬁcations of the shock processes is an attractive feature
of the optimal rule, especially when exogenous disturbances cannot be observed directly. The robust
optimal rule depends however indirectly on the assumptions about the shock processes to the extent
that they aﬀect the worst-case parameter conﬁguration, but this turns out having little impact.
Another interesting feature of the optimal rule is that it is super-inertial, i.e., it involves response
coeﬃcients to lagged interest rates that are larger than one. As ﬁrst shown in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999), and Woodford (1999), this feature of monetary policy allows the central bank to
aﬀect the private sector’s expectations appropriately.
We have shown that in the presence of parameter uncertainty, the robust policy rule implies
that the interest rate responds in general more strongly to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation, to changes in
the output gap, and is super-inertial to an even greater extent, than is the case in the absence of
uncertainty. This result holds quite generally in the model considered, provided that there is enough
uncertainty in particular about the type of supply shocks. Even if he responds more strongly, in
the presence of parameter uncertainty, the policymaker is cautious in our framework. In fact he is
even more cautious than in Brainard’s model, as he cares very much about worst-case situations.
We presented an example in which “being cautious” does not necessarily mean “to do less”.
The robust optimal rule derived here is designed to be robust against a speciﬁc type of un-
certainty, namely uncertainty about some key parameters of the model, and the results obtained
here are speciﬁc to the environment considered. One may however be uncertain about many other
31For a comparison of the performance of both rules in the absence of parameter uncertainty, see Giannoni (2000).
34aspects of the model such as the formation of expectations, the variables entering each equation,
the number of lags of each variable, and so on. Some of these types of uncertainty can be stud-
ied in the context of parameter uncertainty, and the approach described in section 2 can still be
applied in such cases. This approach has the advantage of being transparent, allowing a simple
characterization of the robust optimal rule, and providing an intuitive understanding of the results
obtained. However if the uncertainty considered involves disjoint models or, in signiﬁcantly larger
models, uncertainty about a very large number of parameters, the proposed approach may not be
feasible. In this case, alternative methods imposing less structure on the uncertainty, or methods
based on model averaging may be better suited.
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40Table 1: Calibrated Parameter Values
Structural parameters (benchmark case)
βσ κ ω
estimate: 0.99 0.1571 0.0238 0.4729
std. error: − 0.0328 0.0035 0.0946
lower bound: − 0.0915 0.0168 0.2837
upper bound: − 0.2227 0.0308 0.6621
Shock processes
Variance-covariance matrix
of ut ≡ [δt,ε t,μ t]








41Table 2: Policy Rules and Statistics
Coefficients of policy rule Statistics
π t x t x t- 1 i t- 1 i t- 2 V[π] V[x]V [ i] E[L 0]
Optimal Rules
ν = 0 (ψ
0,θ
0) 0.641 0.325 -0.325 2.163 -1.010 0.130 10.599 1.921 1.097
(ψ
0,θ
∗) 0.641 0.325 -0.325 2.163 -1.010 0.408 9.488 5.838 2.247
(ψ
∗,θ
0) 1.424 0.559 -0.559 2.350 -1.010 0.126 7.334 2.806 1.144
(ψ
∗,θ
∗) 1.424 0.559 -0.559 2.350 -1.010 0.366 5.325 6.635 2.192
ν = .5 (ψ
0,θ
0) 0.641 0.325 -0.325 2.163 -1.010 0.213 4.435 0.718 0.597
(ψ
0,θ
∗) 0.641 0.325 -0.325 2.163 -1.010 0.790 24.659 2.116 2.482
(ψ
∗,θ
0) 1.424 0.559 -0.559 2.350 -1.010 0.182 3.831 1.081 0.622
(ψ
∗,θ
∗) 1.424 0.559 -0.559 2.350 -1.010 0.592 26.086 2.439 2.429
ν = 1 (ψ
0,θ
0) 0.641 0.325 -0.325 2.163 -1.010 0.569 5.759 0.257 0.908
(ψ
0,θ
∗) 0.641 0.325 -0.325 2.163 -1.010 2.431 88.093 0.724 6.859
(ψ
∗,θ
0) 1.424 0.559 -0.559 2.350 -1.010 0.490 7.057 0.415 0.929
(ψ
∗,θ
∗) 1.424 0.559 -0.559 2.350 -1.010 1.833 97.981 0.848 6.769
Estimated  Historical
ν = 0 (ψ,θ
0) 0.424 0.297 -0.032 1.160 -0.430 0.079 11.852 2.952 1.349
(ψ,θ
∗) 0.424 0.297 -0.032 1.160 -0.430 1.284 14.891 14.184 5.357
ν = .5 (ψ,θ
0) 0.424 0.297 -0.032 1.160 -0.430 0.465 3.737 1.504 1.001
(ψ,θ
∗) 0.424 0.297 -0.032 1.160 -0.430 11.782 9.122 17.341 16.322
ν = 1 (ψ,θ
0) 0.424 0.297 -0.032 1.160 -0.430 1.363 1.469 0.959 1.661
(ψ,θ
∗) 0.424 0.297 -0.032 1.160 -0.430 36.041 22.245 27.291 43.568

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Impulse responses to a shock δ (ρδ =0 .35).
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Figure 6: E [L0] with optimal
¡
ψ0¢
















































Figure 7: V [π] with optimal
¡
ψ0¢











































Figure 8: V [x] with optimal
¡
ψ0¢


















































Figure 9: V [i] with optimal
¡
ψ0¢
and robust optimal (ψ∗) policy rules.















































Figure 10: E [L0] with optimal
¡
ψ0¢
, robust optimal (ψ∗) policy rules, and large uncertainty about
σ,κ,ω.
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